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THE SIGNIFICANT CASES OF THE HONORABLE THEODORE 
MCMILLIAN DURING HIS TENURE ON THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 1978 - 1999 
THE HONORABLE DONALD P. LAY* 
I first met Judge Theodore McMillian in 1978 at a seminar held in Aspen, 
Colorado.  He had just been appointed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit.  I did not have an opportunity to meet with him on the first day of the 
seminar because, as I later learned, he was taken to the hospital the previous 
evening owing to problems adjusting to the higher altitude.  Thankfully, he 
adjusted.  Since that first meeting and throughout the last twenty years, we 
have become close personal friends.  His approach to judicial review focuses 
on compassion for humanity and the worth of the individual.  Any person who 
appears before Judge McMillian can be assured of this simple fact: he will give 
their case a full and fair review.  Because of his scholastic excellence, his 
dedication and compassion for the individual, I am confident that he would 
have been seriously considered for elevation to the United States Supreme 
Court if he had only been a younger man at the time of the vacancies. 
Judge McMillian was born in 1919 in St. Louis, Missouri, the oldest of ten 
children raised by his mother, grandmother and stepfather.1  He attended 
Vashon High School in St. Louis, where he was class president and a member 
of the National Honor Society.2 He graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Lincoln 
University in Jefferson City, Missouri, in 1941, with degrees in mathematics 
and physics.3 
He was drafted during World War II and attained the rank of Second 
Lieutenant in the Army Signal Corps.4  After the war, he wanted to become a 
physicist or a physician.5  But due to the limited number of spots open to 
African-Americans in medical school at that time, there was a five year wait 
before he could be admitted.6  As a second choice, he applied to the St. Louis 
 
* United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 
 1. Karen L. Tokarz, Comment, Tribute to Judge Theodore McMillian, 52 WASH. U. J. URB 
& CONTEMP. L. 5, 6 (1997). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 6-7. 
 4. Id. at 7. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Tokarz, supra note 1, at 7. 
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University School of Law.7  He was accepted and began his brilliant career in 
legal studies.  Again, he excelled in the classroom and graduated from law 
school first in his class.8  He also became the first African-American inducted 
into Alpha Sigma Nu, the National Jesuit Honor Fraternity.9 
Judge McMillian began his career in the law rather humbly.  Because no 
large firm in St. Louis would hire him, he and another classmate set out on 
their own in the outskirts of the downtown St. Louis business area.10  He left 
private practice in 1953 when he was hired as an Assistant Circuit Attorney.11  
In 1956, Governor Phil Donnelly appointed him to the St. Louis Circuit Court 
where he presided over various criminal and civil cases.12  Later, because of 
his profound interest in juvenile justice, he served in the Juvenile Court for six 
and one-half years.13  After being passed over twice, Governor Warren 
Hearnes appointed him to the Missouri Court of Appeals in St. Louis in 1972.  
He was the first African-American appointed to the appellate bench in 
Missouri.14  In 1978, President Jimmy Carter selected Judge McMillian to 
become the first African-American on the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit.15  Since that time, Judge McMillian has written more than 
1,000 opinions as a United States Circuit Judge.16 
Every judicial officer, state or federal, has occasion during their career to 
attend many tributes and recognitions for distinguished colleagues.  I have 
personally attended a plethora of banquets honoring various judicial officers, 
including Supreme Court Justices.  Of all of these occasions, however, the St. 
Louis University School of Law’s banquet in honor of Judge McMillian’s 80th 
birthday was the most heartwarming.  Over 1,200 lawyers, law professors from 
all of the Missouri law schools and many notable citizens of St. Louis and the 
State of Missouri attended the tribute that evening.  The tribute was held in the 
large banquet hall at the new Civic Center in St. Louis.  There was not an 
empty table.  Many of Judge McMillian’s childhood friends attended and made 
moving tributes.  That evening will always mark a high point in my career.  I 
was overwhelmed by the demonstration of love and respect for Ted McMillian, 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Tokarz, supra note 1, at 8. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 9. Even after his appointment to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge 
McMillian continued his interest in juvenile law, regularly attending national meetings of state 
judges focusing on improvements in juvenile justice. 
 14. Id. at 10. 
 15. Id. at 13. 
 16. Tokarz, supra note 1, at 13. 
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not only in tribute for his public service, but as a magnanimous recognition of 
his personality and greatness. 
Judge McMillian’s life exemplifies not only a profound love of the law but 
also a personal intimacy with his fellow citizens.  Judge McMillian’s modesty 
and authenticity have set him above the average jurist. My life and judicial 
tenure have been made far richer and more rewarding because of my 
relationship with the Honorable Theodore McMillian. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
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APPENDIX 
CASES AUTHORED BY 
 THE HONORABLE THEODORE MCMILLIAN 
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE, EIGHTH CIRCUIT 1978-1999 
Others in this tribute discuss Judge McMillian’s judicial and personal 
characteristics as well as the many honors that he has received throughout his 
lifetime.  As a service to the bench and the bar, however, I thought it useful to 
set forth some of the significant decisions that he has written since being 
appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.  I have 
therefore set out in this appendix a digest of some of his opinions. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & CIVIL RIGHTS 
Judge McMillian has been a protector and advocate of the civil and 
constitutional rights of all people.  The great number of cases exemplifying his 
dedication prevents a thorough review of each case, but these selections offer 
an insight to Judge McMillian’s strong beliefs.  It is perhaps Judge 
McMillian’s many opinions involving questions of constitutional law and civil 
rights that best exemplify his search for fairness under the law. 
For example, in Krantz v. City of Fort Smith,17 church members brought an 
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various cities challenging their 
ordinances prohibiting church members from placing literature on unattended 
vehicles parked on public property.18  After the district court granted summary 
judgment for the cities, Judge McMillian held that the members had standing 
to challenge the ordinance,19 and the ordinances were not narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant governmental interest.20  As a result, the Eighth Circuit 
reversed the district court’s decision .21 
In Franklin v. Lockhart,22 a prison inmate brought a civil rights complaint 
against prison authorities for alleged violations of free exercise and Eighth 
Amendment rights.23  The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous, 
 
 17. Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, 160 F.3d 1214 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 18. Id. at 1215. 
 19. Id. at 1215, 1218. 
 20. Id. at 1222. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Franklin v. Lockhart, 890 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 23. Id. 
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and the inmate appealed.24  Judge McMillian held that the allegations in the 
inmate’s complaint pertaining to work he had to perform while assigned to the 
prison hoe squad were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim.25  He 
also held that the inmate’s allegation that handling manure and dead animals is 
contrary to his Muslim faith was sufficient to state a free exercise claim and 
required further factual findings.26 
In Mergens v. Board of Education of Westside Community Schools,27 the 
students of a public secondary school appealed from a district court order 
finding that the formation of a Christian bible study club at the high school 
violated the Establishment Clause.28  In reversing the district court, Judge 
McMillian held that the public high school was a limited open forum for 
purposes of the Equal Access Act (“Act”), and that the Act did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.29 
In Stiles v. Blunt,30 an underage office-seeker moved for a preliminary 
injunction to prevent state officials from refusing to certify him as a candidate 
for the Missouri House of Representatives.31  Judge McMillian held that the 
rational basis standard, rather than the strict scrutiny standard, was appropriate 
for determining whether Missouri’s constitutional minimum-age requirement 
for state representatives violated equal protection.32  He found that the age 
requirement was “rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in a mature 
and experienced legislature,”33 and that the district court properly refused to 
calculate the office-seeker’s age from the date of conception in accordance 
with the preamble to the Missouri Abortion Act.34 
In Independent Charities of America, Inc. v. Minnesota,35 charitable fund-
raisers brought an action for declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction 
against statutory amendments imposing local connection requirements for 
participating in the Minnesota state employees’ annual charitable fund-raiser.36  
Judge McMillian held that the amendments did not violate free speech rights of 
charities and that the legislature had a rational basis for imposing local 
connection requirements in amendments without violating the Equal Protection 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 97. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Mergens v. Board of Educ. Of Westside Community Schs., 867 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 
1989). 
 28. Id. at 1077. 
 29. Id. at 1079-80. 
 30. Stiles v. Blunt, 912 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 31. Id. at 261-62. 
 32. Id. at 265. 
 33. Id. at 268. 
 34. Id. at 269. 
 35. Independent Charities of Am., Inc. v. Minnesota, 82 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 36. Id. at 794-95. 
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Clause.37  In addition, he reasoned that the amendments in question reasonably 
promoted state objectives without violating the Due Process Clause and that 
the state was acting as an employer in restricting access to its workplace, 
which supported the application of the market participant exception to the 
Commerce Clause.38 
DISCRIMINATION 
In Moylan v. Maries County,39 a female ambulance employee filed an 
employment discrimination action against the sheriff and the county.40  The 
employee appealed after a jury found against her.41  Judge McMillian 
remanded the case to determine whether the county could be held liable for 
creating a sexually hostile work environment in violation of Title VII.42  The 
employee, however, failed to preserve her claim with respect to the allegedly 
prejudicial opening argument by defense counsel and that issue was not 
preserved for appellate review.43 
In Adams v. Nolan,44 a female police officer brought an employment 
discrimination action against the police department because she had been 
denied requests for light duty assignments during her pregnancy.45  In a bench 
 
 37. Id. at 797-98. 
 38. Id. at 798. See also Ghane v. West, 148 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 1998) (proffered reasons for 
discharge were pretext for discrimination); Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(inmate who gave birth subjected to cruel and unusual punishment); Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor 
Ctr., 90 F.3d 285 (8th Cir. 1996) (court had no authority to enter judgment in favor of 
defendants); Hayes v. Long, 72 F.3d 70 (8th Cir. 1995) (inmate established right not to handle 
pork based on religious objections); Schanou v. Lancaster County Sch. Dist. No. 160,, 62 F.3d 
1040 (8th Cir. 1995) (distribution of bibles on school grounds upheld); Duckworth v. Ford, 995 
F.2d 858 (8th Cir. 1993) (protected speech permitted action against fellow public employee); 
Shepherd v. Kansas City Call, 905 F.2d 1152 (8th Cir. 1990) (further proceedings necessary to 
determine work agreements); Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 867 F.2d 1063 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(determination of damages from civil rights claim); Hamer v. Brown, 831 F.2d 1398 (8th Cir. 
1987) (professor’s public speech protected under First Amendment); Murphy v. Missouri Dep’t 
of Corrections, 814 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1987) (total withholding of mail from white supremacist 
organization too restrictive); Fields v. City of Omaha, 810 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1987) (arrest under 
unconstitutional ordinance permitted claim for damages); United States v. Norton, 780 F.2d 21 
(8th Cir. 1985) (no Sixth Amendment violation for denial of fair cross-section in jury); Hazen v. 
Pasley, 768 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) (transfer of prisoner’s property to sheriff violated public 
policy). 
 39. Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1986). 
 40. Id. at 747. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 750. 
 43. Id. at 751. 
 44. Adams v. Nolan, 962 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 45. Id. at 792. 
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trial, the district court denied relief and the officer appealed.46  In reversing the 
district court, 47 Judge McMillian held the police department’s proffered 
reason for denying the requested light duty assignments was pretextual, and the 
officer was entitled to relief on her Title VII sex discrimination claim.48 
FEDERAL PROCEDURE & JURISDICTION 
Judge McMillian wrote many opinions involving various jurisdictional 
issues.49  Several of his opinions also dealt with procedural questions presented 
on appeal, which allowed for a wide variety of holdings.50 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 796. 
 48. Id. Judge McMillian has written over 200 cases involving all aspects of employment 
discrimination. The following cases are illustrative of the issues he confronted. See generally, 
Widoe v. Dist. No. 111 Otoe County Sch., 147 F.3d 726 (8th Cir. 1998) (reversing grant of 
summary judgment on grounds that evidence of pretext existed which masked the Board’s age 
discrimination); O’Bryan v. KTIV Television, 64 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1995) (reversing in part 
grant of summary judgment on grounds that evidence of pretext existed within age discrimination 
claim); Taggart v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 F.3d 269 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing dismissal 
and remanding on grounds that state law handicap discrimination claim was not preempted by 
Railway Labor Act); Weissman v. Congregation Shaare Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(reversing grant of summary judgment based on defendant-temple’s lack of immunity from age 
discrimination claims); Throgmorton v. United States Forgecraft Corp., 965 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 
1992) (affirming a finding of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII based on the employer’s 
failure to proffer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff in response to 
the plaintiff’s prima facie case); Shepherd, 905 F.2d at 1152 (reversing finding for defendant and 
remanding to determine key procedural issue); Propst v. Leapley, 886 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(reversing finding of no racial discrimination by prison officials against inmate as “clearly 
erroneous”); Edwards v. Jewish Hosp. Of St. Louis, 855 F.2d 1345 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming 
finding of racial discrimination in violation of statute guaranteeing all persons the same rights as 
white citizens); Crutchfield v. Maverick Tube Corp., 854 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming 
finding of no sex discrimination by employer based on employee’s inability to perform duties of 
the position); EEOC v. M.D. Pneumatics, Inc., 779 F.2d 21 (8th Cir. 1985) (reversing denial of 
retroactive seniority to victims of sex discrimination and finding district court to have abused its 
discretion in so denying); Greenwood v. Ross, 778 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1985) (reversing on 
grounds that district court’s refusal to consider retaliatory discharge claim was improper based on 
plaintiff’s success in establishing a prima facie case and remanding with directions for 
determination of defendant-university’s entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Heath v. 
John Morrell & Co., 768 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1985) (reversing grant of summary judgment based 
on both evidence of pretext and the refusal to give finding of proper discharge in prior 
unemployment compensation proceeding preclusive effect). 
 49. See generally United States v. Yankton 163 F.3d 1096 (8th Cir. 1999) (accessory after 
the fact not subject to exception to federal jurisdiction); Carney v. BIC Corp, 83 F.3d 629 (8th 
Cir. 1996) (dismissed appeal for lack of jurisdiction); Meyers v. Trinity Med. Ctr., 983 F.2d 905 
(8th Cir. 1993)(malpractice claim dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction); Insurance Co. of 
Pennsylvania v. Syntex Corp., 964 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1992) (pending parallel state claim 
permitted dismissal); National City Bank v. Coopers and Lybrand, 802 F.2d 990 (8th Cir. 
1986)(remand order not reviewable); Northwest S.D. Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Smith, 784 F.2d 323 
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The jurisdictional case with the most interesting implication was Kaiser v. 
Memorial Blood Center of Minneapolis, Inc.51  In Kaiser, a patient brought a 
negligence action against the blood bank after allegedly contracting human 
immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”) due to inadequate screening of donors and a 
failure to warn of the risk of HIV infection through blood transfusion.52  
Writing for the court, Judge McMillian held that the Red Cross charter 
established original federal jurisdiction and that the action accrued for 
limitations purposes when a patient received a blood transfusion during 
surgery.53 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
One of the more significant cases dealing with agency review was Wilkins 
v. Secretary of Interior,54 which involved a challenge to a decision by the 
Secretary of the Department of the Interior to remove wild horses from a 
national park.55  The district court permanently enjoined removal of the horses, 
but Judge McMillian reversed, holding that the district court incorrectly 
applied an arbitrary and capricious standard of review.56 
 
(8th Cir. 1986) (statute did not create federal casue of action on Indian trust lands); U.S. v. South 
Dakota, 665 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1981) (obligation to accept non-Indians in order to obtain HUD 
financing did not defeat federal jurisdiction); U.S. v. French, 628 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1980) 
(Hobbs Act extortion did not affect interstate commerce). 
 50. See, e.g., St. Croix Waterway Ass’n v. Meyer, 178 F.3d 515, 521 (8th Cir. 1999) (slow- 
no wake regulations not unconstitutionally vague and did not violate public trust doctrine); 
Marshall v. Warwick, 155 F.3d 1027, 1030 (8th Cir. 1998) (service of process to mother’s place 
of employment not sufficient); Shempert v. Harwick Chem. Corp., 151 F.3d 793, 798 (8th Cir. 
1998) cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1028 (1999) (Title VII filing requirement not tolled where 
circumstances causing late filing were never beyond party’s control); Harris v. Folk Constr. Co., 
138 F.3d 365, 371 (8th Cir. 1998) (delegation of duties that require final and independent 
determination of fact or law to magistrate judge not within authority of the district court); Hillary 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 123 F.3d 1041, 1044-45 (8th Cir. 1997) (filing of complaint in 
wrong state not adequate exception to circumvent defense of res judicata); Renfro v. Swift 
Eckrich, Inc., 53 F.3d 1460, 1464 (8th Cir. 1995) (no waiver of right to claim breach of contract 
by accepting non-conforming performance); Scheerer v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 16 F.3d 272, 
275 (8th Cir. 1994) (material issue of fact existed regarding slippery condition in restaurant); 
Hamm v. Groose, 15 F.3d 110, 112 (8th Cir. 1994) (inmate lacked standing to assert denial of 
access without a total denial of such access or actual injury or prejudice); Johnson v. United 
States Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 939 F.2d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 1991) (tenants not entitled to 
attorney fees under Equal Access to Justice Act); Photolab Corp. v. Simplex Specialty Co., 806 
F.2d 807, 811 (8th Cir. 1986) (foreign defendants waived objection to sufficiency of service of 
process). 
 51. Kaiser v. Memorial Blood Ctr. of Minneapolis, Inc., 977 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 52. Id. at 1281. 
 53. Id. at 1283. 
 54. Wilkins v. Secretary of Interior, 995 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 55. Id. at 851. 
 56. Id. at 853. 
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In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt,57 the airline sought review of a 
Department of Transportation rule that allocated reservations of take-off and 
landing slots at Washington National Airport.58  Judge McMillian determined 
that the order was reviewable59 and the Department had the authority to issue 
the rule.60  Further, he held the rule was not arbitrary and capricious,61 the 
comment period limitation was for good cause,62 and an environmental impact 
statement was not required.63 
Throughout many of Judge McMillian’s administrative law opinions, he 
often cited to the failure of one party to exhaust administrative remedies.64  
These cases offer examples of Judge McMillian’s belief in fair administrative 
proceedings. 
TORTS 
Judge McMillian has had the opportunity to write many opinions which 
fall under the broad umbrella of tort law.65  Illustrative of the complexity of 
these cases was Wright v. Farmers Co-Op of Arkansas & Oklahoma.66  In that 
case, the owners of a motor home brought suit against the Farmers Co-op 
seeking recovery for injuries received after a propane tank in the motor home, 
which was over-filled by the co-op’s employee, exploded.67  Judge McMillian 
 
 57. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1981). 
 58. Id. at 1311. 
 59. Id. at 1314. 
 60. Id. at 1317. 
 61. Id. at 1318. 
 62. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d at 1321. 
 63. Id. at 1322. 
 64. See, e.g., Sharps v. United States Forest Serv., 28 F.3d 851, 854 (8th Cir. 1994) (failure 
to exhaust administrative remedies); Williams v. Little Rock Mun. Water Works, 21 F.3d 218, 
222, 223-24 (8th Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal of complaint based on failure to file timely 
administrative appeal and establish official policy, custom, or practice elements of §§ 1981 and 
1983 claims); Boge v. Ringland-Johnson-Crowley Co., 976 F.2d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(equitable considerations did not excuse failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Shatz v. 
United States Dep’t of Justice, 873 F.2d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 65. See, e.g., Brosnahan v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 892 F.2d 730, 734 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(question of adequate supervision of boarding process by airline and whether injury was 
foreseeable suitable for jury to decide); Rolfes v. International Harvester Co., 817 F.2d 471, 474 
(8th Cir. 1987) (submitting products liability assumption of risk defense to jury improper); City 
of Omaha v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 767 F.2d 457, 459-60 (8th Cir. 1985) (statute 
of limitations appropriately based on professional negligence or breach of warranty); Anderson v. 
United States, 724 F.2d 608, 610 (8th Cir. 1983) (Feres doctrine barred Federal Torts Claims Act 
suit); Peterson v. Auto Wash Mfg. & Supply Co., 676 F.2d 949, 952-53 (8th Cir. 1982) (failure to 
warn action denied for contributory fault); Fletcher v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 621 F.2d 902, 908 
(8th Cir. 1980) (tortious conduct of employer not barred by statute of limitations). 
 66. Wright v. Farmers Co-op of Ark. & Okla., 620 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 67. Id. at 696. 
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reversed the trial court, holding that it improperly instructed the jury to enter a 
verdict for the defendant if the jury found mechanical failure was the 
proximate cause of the fire.68  He held that the instruction was unsupported by 
the evidence and could have misled the jury.69 
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT 
Judge McMillian has written numerous opinions involving issues dealing 
with labor relations.70  Among the most notable is Pony Express Courier, 
Corp. v. NLRB.71  Pony Express Courier Corporation petitioned for review of a 
final order of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), which found that 
the Company had refused to bargain in violation of the National Labor 
Relations Act (“NLRA”).72  Judge McMillian granted enforcement of the order 
and held there was substantial evidence to support the NLRB’s determinations 
that the courier-guards were not “guards” within the meaning of the NLRA and 
that the dispatchers were not “supervisors” within the meaning of the NLRA.73 
In Volunteers of America-Minnesota-Bar None Boys Ranch v. NLRB,74 the 
Ranch, a religiously-affiliated residential treatment center for children that was 
recognized as a “church” by the Internal Revenue Service, sought review of an 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 697. 
 70. NLRB v. American Linen Supply Co., 945 F.2d 1428, 1433 (8th Cir. 1991) (employer 
illegally discharged economic strikers); Hall v. NLRB, 941 F.2d 684, 689 (8th Cir. 1991) (anti-
union motivation was underlying factor for layoff and discharge); Waverly-Cedar Falls Health 
Care Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 933 F.2d 626, 631 (8th Cir. 1991) (nurses not “supervisors” for purposes 
of certifying a bargaining unit); Bryan Mem’l Hosp. v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 1259, 1263 (8th Cir. 
1987) (withdrawal of recognition from union violated Labor Relations Act); Wright Mem’l Hosp. 
v. NLRB, Region 17, 771 F.2d 400, 407 (8th Cir. 1985) (enforced NLRB order requiring hospital 
to bargain with a union); Teamsters Local Union No. 688 v. NLRB, 756 F.2d 659, 663 (8th Cir. 
1985) (misapplication of the law by NLRB required a remand); NLRB v. Winco Petroleum Co., 
668 F.2d 973, 978 (8th Cir. 1982) (successor employer was obligated to remedy predecessor’s 
unfair labor practices); Beaird-Poulan Div., Emerson Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 649 F.2d 589, 595 (8th 
Cir. 1981) (union election was not required to be set aside); Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. 
NLRB, 641 F.2d 553, 560 (8th Cir. 1981) (renewal of probationary period after strike was unfair 
labor practice); NLRB v. American Postal Workers Union, St. Louis, Mo., 618 F.2d 1249, 1261 
(8th Cir. 1980) (Postal Service not in violation of National Labor Relations Act); NLRB v. 
Vitronic Div. of Penn Corp., 630 F.2d 561, 565 (8th Cir. 1979) (requirement to sign request for 
reinstatement not an unfair labor practice); Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 1310, 
1316 (8th Cir. 1979) (substantial evidence supported violation of labor act); NLRB v. Int’l Bhd. 
of Elec. Workers, Local 265, 604 F.2d 1091,1098 (8th Cir. 1979) (use of terms in picketing 
imported meaning in union’s request); American Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. NLRB, 600 F.2d 132, 138 
(8th Cir. 1979) (employer required to cease enforcing rules regulating writing, making and 
distributing of statements by employees). 
 71. 981 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 72. Id. at 358 (361). 
 73. Id. at 365-65. 
 74. 752 F.2d 345 (8th Cir. 1985). 
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order of the NLRB requiring it to bargain with the union representing the 
center’s employees.75  Judge McMillian held the assertion of jurisdiction by 
the NLRB over the treatment center did not pose a significant risk of 
governmental entanglement with religion, nor did it violate the Free Exercise 
or Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.76  In so holding, Judge 
McMillian noted the center’s primary purpose was the care of children, not the 
propagation of faith.77  There were no ministers on the staff at the center, and 
the lay staff, chosen without regard to religious beliefs or affiliations, did not 
propagate tenets of church.78  Furthermore, the center’s staff did not conduct 
religious classes or services and did not attempt to persuade children to accept 
the church’s sectarian doctrines.79  Finally, Judge McMillian found that 
ministers of various denominations from throughout the community conducted 
services at the center, and the center and its employees performed essentially 
secular functions.80 
In NLRB v. Van Gorp Corp.,81 the NLRB petitioned for enforcement of its 
order requiring the employer to bargain with the union as the exclusive 
bargaining representative for some of its employees.82  Judge McMillian held 
the cumulative effect of serious last-minute misrepresentations by the union 
and the threatening course of conduct of the union supporters showed that the 
union election took place in an atmosphere, so hostile to an employee’s free 
choice so as to preclude the certification of the union.83  Thus, the court held 
the Board’s certification of the union should be set aside.84 
 
 75. Id. at 346. 
 76. Id. at 349. 
 77. Id. at 348. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Volunteers of America-Minnesota-Bar None Boys Ranch, 752 F.2d at 348. 
 80. Id. 
 81. 615 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 82. Id. at 759-60. 
 83. Id. at 765-66. 
 84. Id. at 766. 
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PROPERTY, TRUSTS & ESTATES 
In North Dakota ex rel. Board of University & School Lands v. United 
States,85 North Dakota brought an action against the United States seeking to 
quiet title for portions of the riverbed of the Little Missouri River in which the 
United States claimed a fee ownership interest.86  Judge McMillian affirmed 
the district court’s decision in favor of the United States, holding that evidence 
supported a finding the river was not navigable at the time of North Dakota’s 
statehood87 and that, therefore, the United States had fee title to the property.88 
In Kane v. United States89 a home purchaser brought an action against the 
United States to recover for the presence of asbestos within the house.90  In 
affirming the district court, Judge McMillian held that the “discretionary 
function” exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity protected the United 
States from liability for the failure of the Veterans Administration and its 
management broker to inspect the house for asbestos prior to the sale of the 
house.91  The court also held that because the house contained asbestos, it was 
a “consumer product in consumer use” and, therefore, was not a “facility” 
within the meaning of the Comprehensive Environmental Response 
Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”).92 
In Knox v. Lichtenstein,93 a bank attempted to permanently enjoin the 
trustees of two profit-sharing trusts from proceeding with a civil action for 
breach of fiduciary duties against the bank.94  The district court denied the 
 
 85. 972 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 86. Id. at 236. 
 87. Id. at 240. 
 88. Id. 
 89. 15 F.3d 87 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 90. Id. at 88. 
 91. Id. at 88-89. 
 92. Id. at 89. For additional property decisions see Universal Title Ins. Co. v. United States, 
942 F.2d 1311, 1313 (8th Cir. 1991) (release of federal tax lien sought in net proceeds of sale); In 
re Holiday Intervals, Inc., 931 F.2d 500, 502-03 (8th Cir. 1991) (land sale contracts not 
instruments within meaning of Missouri Uniform Commercial Code); Glosemeyer v. Missouri-
Kansas-Texas R.R., 879 F.2d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1989) (challenge to use of railroad line as 
recreational trails); Paulucci v. City of Duluth, 826 F.2d 780, 783 (8th Cir. 1987) (denied claim of 
taking for non-public use); Herring v. United States, 781 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir. 1986) (owner 
was prevailing party after recognition of right to just compensation); United States v. 341.45 
Acres of Land, 751 F.2d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1984) (denial of costs and fees after condemnation 
permitted); Hockett v. Larson, 742 F.2d 1123, 1125-26 (8thCir. 1984) (quit claim deed partially 
valid with one valid signature); Caffrey Farms, Inc. v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 739 F.2d 1366, 
1368 (8th Cir. 1984) (pipeline easements not subject to reformation); Collier v. City of 
Springdale, 733 F.2d 1311, 1317 (8th Cir. 1984) (adequate state remedies preempted federal 
takings claim); United States v. 38.60 Acres of Land, 625 F.2d 196, 200 (8th Cir. 1980) (impaired 
drainage in condemnation not compensable as severance damages). 
 93. 654 F.2d 19 (8th Cir. 1981). 
 94. Id. at 19-20. 
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bank’s motion.95  On appeal, Judge McMillian held the district court had 
properly exercised its discretionary authority in dismissing the trustees’ 
action.96  Additionally, that dismissal did not operate as an adjudication on the 
merits, which would have permitted an injunction of the related state court 
action under the doctrine of res judicata.97 
In Drye Family 1995 Trust v. United States,98 a trust created by the 
taxpayer’s daughter filed a wrongful levy action against the United States.99  In 
turn, the United States filed a counterclaim to reduce the tax assessments to the 
judgment.100  Judge McMillian held the taxpayer’s disclaimer of his mother’s 
estate under Arkansas law did not void state law interests already established 
under Arkansas law.101  Therefore, the court decided the federal liens were 
enforceable against the trust.102 
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & ANTITRUST 
In Insty*Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech Industries, Inc.,103 the designer and seller of 
quick-change drill chucks, brought an infringement claim under § 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, against the manufacturer of component parts 
for the designer after the manufacturer began developing its own competing 
products.104  The district court entered summary judgment for the 
manufacturer.105  Judge McMillian reversed and remanded, holding the district 
court was required to apply judicially established factors in evaluating the 
likelihood of confusion.106  He further held the district court erred in placing 
primary weight on its visual examination of the products107 and material issues 
of fact existed as to the likelihood of confusion, distinctiveness, and 
functionality.108 
 
 95. Id. at 19. 
 96. Id. at 22. 
 97. Id. See also Robbins v. Iowa Rd. Builders Co., 828 F.2d 1348, 1355 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(allowed action by trustees to recover delinquent contributions). 
 98. 152 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 99. Id. at 893. 
 100. Id. at 897. 
 101. Id. at 899. 
 102. Id. 
 103. 95 F.3d 663 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 104. Id. at 665-66. 
 105. Id. at 665. 
 106. Id. at 669. 
 107. Id. at 670. 
 108. Insty*Bit, Inc., 95 F.3d at 672, 674. See also Morrill v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 747 
F.2d 1217, 1219 (8th Cir. 1984) (inventor brought claim of fraud and breach of contract against 
manufacturer). 
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In John Deere & Co. v. Payless Cashways, Inc.,109 the plaintiff again 
brought suit under the Lanham Act to enjoin the defendant from using the 
word “furrow” as the name and service mark of its retail stores and on its 
advertisements.110  After review, the district court denied the relief.111  In 
affirming the district court, Judge McMillian stated the plaintiff was not 
entitled to injunctive relief because of its failure to associate the “furrow” 
trademark with any of its products.112  The court also held the district court’s 
determination that there was no likelihood of confusion because of the vast 
difference in the styles and types of advertisements was not clearly 
erroneous.113 
In United States v. Misle Bus & Equipment Co.,114 the defendants were 
convicted of conspiracy to suppress competition surrounding the “sale of 
school bus bodies to public school districts in Nebraska and western Iowa,” in 
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.115  In holding the 
convictions were supported by sufficient evidence, Judge McMillian opined 
there was evidence of a similar bid-rigging/market allocation scheme 
admissible to show intent.116  He also held lay testimony describing the 
agreements to fix prices and allocate the market was admissible117 and that the 
jury instructions did not over-emphasize the government’s multiple theories of 
liability.118 
 
 109. 681 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1982). 
 110. Id. at 522. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 523. 
 113. Id at 524. See also Applied Innovations, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 876 F.2d 
626, 627 (8th Cir. 1989) (university brought action against developer for infringement of 
psychological test); Vitek Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 675 F.2d 190 (8th Cir. 1982) (denied 
injunctive relief for trademark infringement ); SquirtCo. v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1088 
(8th Cir. 1980) (trademark infringement required issuance of an injunction). 
 114. 967 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 115. Id. at 1227, 1229. 
 116. Id. at 1233-34. 
 117. Id. at 1234. 
 118. Id. at 1235. See also North Star Steel Co. v. MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co., 184 
F.3d 732, 739-40 (8th Cir. 1999) (company immune from federal antitrust liability under state 
action immunity doctrine); Local Union 257, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Sebastion Elec., 121 
F.3d 1180, 1186 (8th Cir 1997) (fund to reimburse wages to union members not antitrust 
violation); Jackson v. Swift Eckrich, Inc., 53 F.3d 1452, 1460 (8th Cir. 1995) (Sherman Act four-
year limitation period applied to Packers and Stockyards Act); Morgenstern v. Wilson, 29 F.3d 
1291, 1294 (8th Cir. 1994) (surgeon brought suit against group medical practice alleging 
violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act); In re Wirebound Boxes Antitrust Litig., 993 F.2d 152, 
154 (8th Cir. 1993) (claims to certain antitrust settlement funds properly denied as untimely); 
Minnesota Transp. Regulation Bd. v. United States, 966 F.2d 335, 341 (8th Cir. 1992) (Interstate 
Commerce Commission applied to property purchases); South Dakota Collectibles, Inc. v. 
Plough, Inc., 952 F.2d 211, 214 (8th Cir. 1991) (representative lacked standing to sue for antitrust 
damages); Health Care Equalization Comm. v. Iowa Med. Soc’y, 851 F.2d 1020, 1032 (8th Cir. 
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TAXATION 
Although most of Judge McMillian’s tax opinions involve the federal 
government and a private taxpayer,119 some involve tax disputes among 
governmental bodies.  Such was the case in Minnesota Department of Revenue 
v. United States,120 a dispute over the priority of certain tax liens.  The district 
court held the state’s tax liens were perfected (choate) at the time the tax 
returns were filed, not when processed, thereby granting priority over federal 
tax liens.121  Judge McMillian reversed the district court, determining that the 
state tax liens were not entitled to priority and that they were not established at 
the time the state tax returns were filed because, under federal law, the state 
must take administrative action to acknowledge taxpayer liability before its 
liens could be choate.122 
 
1988) (dismissed claims against non-profit health care service corporation ); In re Hops Antitrust 
Litig., 832 F.2d 470, 473-74 (8th Cir. 1987) (antitrust action deemed to be an equitable, not a 
legal, action); L & H Sanitation, Inc. v. Lake City Sanitation, Inc., 769 F.2d 517, 519-20 (8th Cir. 
1985) (awarding of franchise by city shielded from antitrust liability by state action immunity 
doctrine); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 759 F.2d 671, 673 (8th Cir. 1985) (enjoining party from 
terminating defendant’s exclusive contract not abuse of discretion by district court); Surman v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 62 (8th Cir. 1984) (state fraud claims 
subject to arbitration); Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692, 704 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(burden of generation of monopoly pricing minimized by anti-competitive effect); Russell Stover 
Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1983) (refusal to sell to dealers not selling at 
suggested prices not coercion); Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 1982) 
(termination of dealer for pricing protection violated Sherman Act); Yellow Forwarding Co. v. 
Atlantic Container Line, 668 F.2d 350, 354 (8th Cir. 1981) (conference agreements exempt from 
federal antitrust laws); Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Ass’n, 666 F.2d 
1130, 1146 (8th Cir. 1981) (exclusive foundation preparation policy constituted illegal tying 
arrangement). 
 119. In re Brown, 82 F.3d 801 (8th Cir. 1996) (failed to rebut prima facie validity of IRS 
proof of claim); Black Hills Corp. v. Commissioner, 73 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 1996) (insurance 
premiums were not deductible as ordinary and necessary business expense); Norwest Corp. v. 
Commissioner., 69 F.3d 1404 (8th Cir. 1995) (taxpayer not entitled to foreign tax credit); Baptiste 
v. Commissioner, 29 F.3d 433 (8th Cir. 1994) (transferee’s obligation to pay tax was res 
judicata); Hefti v. Commissioner, 983 F.2d 868 (8th Cir. 1993) (third party summons tolled 
limitations period for action by IRS); Billion v. U.S., 921 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1990) (taxpayer not 
entitled to interest after IRS errors); U.S. v. Claes, 747 F.2d 491 (8th Cir. 1984) (enforcement of 
IRS summons deemed valid); Snell v. U.S., 680 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1982) (taxpayers not entitled 
to deductions or reductions because of new partners); Universal Title Ins. Co. v. U.S., 942 F.2d 
1311 (8th Cir. 1991) (insurer was not entitled to be subrogated to lienholders who were senior to 
federal tax lien); Noske v. U.S., 911 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1990) (penalty could not be applied 
retroactively); United States v. Williams, 815 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1987) (executive director not 
personally responsible for payment of employment taxes); Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner, 
667 F.2d 675 (8th Cir. 1981) (income delivered after seller’s death not income in respect to 
decedent). 
 120. 184 F.3d 725, (8th Cir. 1999). 
 121. Id. at 726. 
 122. Id. at 730-31. 
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In Shangreau v. Babbitt,123 the mother and heir of a deceased illegitimate 
child whose father predeceased him challenged the constitutionality of the 
definition of “heir” in the White Earth Land Settlement Act of 1985 
(“WELSA”).  WELSA barred an illegitimate child from inheriting 
compensation for an allotment by right of representation through the father.124  
Judge McMillian held, in affirming the grant of summary judgment, that the 
differences between proving paternity and maternity justified the different 
treatment of paternal inheritance by illegitimate children, and that the 
definition of heir did not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate 
children.125 
CRIMINAL LAW, PROCEDURE & SENTENCING 
In United States v. Johnson,126 following the denial of a motion to suppress 
evidence found as the result of a search and seizure of an express mail 
package, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and 
possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.  On appeal, Judge 
McMillian reversed the district court, holding that the particularized facts of 
the case did not support a finding of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
to warrant the interception and detention of the express mail package.127 
In United States v. Leisure,128 defendants were convicted by a jury of 
various racketeering, obstruction of justice, and unauthorized creation of 
destructive devices offenses.  On appeal, Judge McMillian affirmed in part and 
reversed in part.129  He affirmed the district court’s determination that the 
affidavits used in support of the applications for electronic surveillance were 
sufficient.130  He also affirmed the district court’s finding that there was no 
prosecutorial misconduct warranting reversal.131  But he reversed the 
conviction of one of the defendants because the indictment failed to 
sufficiently allege a violation of the statute as amended.132 
In United States v. Dixon,133 the defendants appealed from a district court 
order denying their motions to dismiss the indictment pending against them 
 
 123. 68 F.3d 208 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 124. Id. at 212. 
 125. See Id. at 212-13; See also Lannan v. Maul, 979 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1992) (personal 
administrator sued for breach of contact). 
 126. 171 F.3d 601 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 127. Id. at 605. 
 128. 844 F.2d 1347 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 129. Id. at 1368. 
 130. Id. at 1354-59 (discussing the reasoning for sufficiency of affidavits used in support of 
the applications for surveillance). 
 131. Id. at 1360. 
 132. Id. at 1367. 
 133. 913 F.2d 1305, 1306 (8th Cir. 1990). 
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after the district court had declared a mistrial.  Judge McMillian reversed the 
district court, holding that the denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy 
grounds was appealable under the collateral order doctrine.134  In reviewing the 
double jeopardy claims, Judge McMillian held the district court’s sua sponte 
declaration of a mistrial because of prejudicial television news reports was not 
justified by manifest necessity, and, thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause barred 
re-prosecution of the defendants.135 
In United States v. Childress,136 a defendant was convicted of three counts 
of firearms violations from which he later appealed.  A panel of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the convictions.137  
Following an en banc rehearing on the issue of the government’s use of 
peremptory challenges to remove almost all African-American prospective 
jurors from the jury panel, Judge McMillian, writing for the en banc court, held 
that the government’s use of its peremptory challenges to remove four of five 
African-American prospective jurors did not establish a systematic exclusion 
of African-Americans from the jury process.138 
In United States v. Iron Cloud,139 a criminal defendant was sentenced for 
his escape from a halfway house where he was serving the final portion of his 
sentence.  In vacating the sentence and remanding the case, Judge McMillian 
held that the district court clearly erred by imposing a three-level upward 
adjustment for assaultive behavior and creating the risk of serious bodily injury 
to an officer in the course of an offense or immediate flight.140 
HABEAS CORPUS, PRISONER’S RIGHTS 
Judge McMillian has written many cases involving the issues of habeas 
corpus and prisoner’s rights throughout his time on the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.  He has denied habeas relief far more than he has granted it,141 but all 
 
 134. Id. at 1308-09. 
 135. Id. at 1315. 
 136. 715 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1983). 
 137. Id. at 1313. 
 138. Id. at 1320-21. 
 139. 75 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 140. Id. at 391. 
 141. Judge McMillian denied habeas corpus petitions over sixty times while on the court. 
Predka v. Iowa, 186F.3d 1082(8th Cir. Aug. 4, 1999) (use of state drug tax stamp law did not 
violate the Commerce Clause); Al-Din v. Bowersox, 176 F.3d 1043 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc 
denial of motion to dismiss); Stallings v. Delo, 117 F.3d 378 (8th Cir. 1997) (jury verdict not 
coerced nor due process violation); Vogt v. U.S., 88 F.3d 587 (8th Cir. 1996) (failure to request 
competency hearing not ineffective assistance of counsel); Frizzell v. Hopkins, 87 F.3d 1019 (8th 
Cir. 1996) (claim not novel and failed to allege factual innocence); Krimmel v. Hopkins, 56 F.3d 
873 (8th Cir. 1995) (ineffective counsel claims procedurally defaulted); Allen v. Nix, 55 F.3d 414 
(8th Cir. 1995) (failed to establish constitutional violation); United States v. Duke, 50 F.3d 571 
(8th Cir. 1995) (perjured testimony did not affect jury’s judgment); Krimmel v. Hopkins, 44 F.3d 
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704 (8th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment violations procedurally barred); Griffini v. Mitchell, 31 
F.3d 690 (8th Cir. 1994) (reliance upon timely access to release date no cause to excuse 
procedural default); Lowe-Bey v. Groose, 28 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 1994) (failure of postconviction 
relief counsel to file separate notice of appeal not cause to excuse procedural default); Hughes v. 
Lee County Dist. Court, 9 F.3d 1366 (8th Cir. 1993) (twenty-four hour notice of disciplinary 
proceeding sufficient for due process); Narcisse v. Dahm, 9 F.3d 38 (8th Cir. 1993) (claim of 
legal innocence, not actual innocence, did not present extraordinary case permitting relief); 
Pickens v. Lockhart, 4 F.3d 1446 (8th Cir. 1993) (claim of coerced confession procedurally 
barred); Freeman v. Erickson, 4 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 1993) (confrontation rights not violated); 
Glaze v. Redman, 986 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1993) (exclusion of evidence not deprivation of 
fundamentally fair trial); Parkus v. Delo, 985 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1993) (notice of appeal 
premature); Garcia v. Powers, 973 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992) (state law corroboration requirement 
not cognizable under habeas review); McCann v. Armontrout, 973 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(evidentiary hearing not required for effectiveness question at state trial); Bruns v. Thalacker, 973 
F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1992) (failure to establish actual prejudice to overcome procedural bar); Perez 
v. Groose, 973 F.2d 630 (8th Cir. 1992) (evidence supported conviction); Starchild v. Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, 973 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1992) (house arrest time not credited to sentence); 
Stewart v. Nix, 972 F.2d 967 (8th Cir. 1992) (ninety-five day delay in trial was not Fifth 
Amendment violation); Harris v. Lockhart, 948 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1991) (failure to prove actual 
innocence); Whatley v. Morrison, 947 F.2d 869 (8th Cir. 1991) (prisoner failed to exhaust all 
state remedies); Simpson v. Lockhart, 942 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1991) (state murder statutes not 
unconstitutionally vague); Rapheld v. Delo, 940 F.2d 324 (8th Cir. 1991) (failure to establish 
actual innocence); Williamson v. Jones, 936 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir. 1991) (no error in trial court 
refusal to give specific jury instruction); Mills v. Armontrout, 926 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(decision not to impeach witness not cognizable in habeas review); Wright v. Lockhart, 914 F.2d 
1093 (8th Cir. 1990) (no denial of Sixth Amendment right to fair and impartial jury); Epps v. 
Iowa, 901 F.2d 1481 (8th Cir. 1990) (change of venue not a constitutional violation); Adams v. 
Armontrout, 897 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1990) (failure to state specific, particularized fact for relief); 
Williams-Bey v. Trickey, 894 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1990) (no denial of effective assistance of 
counsel); Sumpter v. Nix, 863 F.2d 563 (8th Cir. 1988) (no violation of double jeopardy because 
of sentences imposed); Aschan v. Auger, 861 F.2d 520 (8th Cir. 1988) (no violation of pretrial 
agreement); Amos v. Minnesota, 849 F.2d 1070 (8th Cir. 1988) (refusal to give instruction on 
lesser-included offense proper); U.S. v. Hutchings, 835 F.2d 185 (8th Cir. 1987) (motions filed in 
incorrect judicial district); Perry v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 831 F.2d 811 (8th Cir. 1987) (untimely 
revocation hearing not prejudicial); Wiggins v. Lockhart, 825 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(allegations insufficient to establish equal protection violation); High Elk v. Solem, 804 F.2d 496 
(8th Cir. 1986) (failure to show that inclusion of evidence would have changed the verdict); 
Johanson v. Pung, 795 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1986) (self defense instruction not due process 
violation); Thrasher v. Armontrout, 784 F.2d 327 (8th Cir. 1986) (victim identification reliable); 
Beard v. Lockhart, 779 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1985) (possession of firearm sufficient to violate terms 
of parole); Warden v. Wyrick, 770 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1985) (denial of mistrial not violation of 
constitutional right to a fair trial); Johnson v. Mabry, 752 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1985) (failure to 
interview witness not sufficient to affect decision to accept plea bargain); Graham v. Solem, 728 
F.2d 1533 (8th Cir. 1984) (victim identification testimony not constitutional violation); Cole v. 
Hunter, 726 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1984) (psychiatrist’s testimony not Fifth Amendment violation); 
Thompson v. Missouri, 724 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1984) (non-disclosure of information not denial 
of fair trial or due process); Hartung v. Omodt, 687 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1982) (placement in 
juvenile facility did not constitute adjudication or permitting claim of double jeopardy); In re 
Assarsson, 687 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1982) (extraditable offenses not within scope of habeas 
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of his opinions exemplify his thorough examination of the prisoner’s diverse 
claims.142 
In Walton v. Caspari, after a criminal defendant’s convictions were 
affirmed, the defendant brought a petition for writ of habeas corpus.143  The 
district court conditionally granted the petition and an appeal was taken.144  In 
affirming the decision, Judge McMillian wrote that the defendant had fairly 
presented his equal protection claim to the state court.145  He held that the 
district court did not err in retroactively applying the rule set forth in Garrett v. 
Morris.146  Garrett held that once prosecutors volunteer their reasons for the 
 
review); Fowler v. Parratt, 682 F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1982) (failure to establish cumulative errors); 
Rhodes v. Foster, 682 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1982) (no constitutional violation as proceeding not 
detrimentally affected); Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1981) (state’s refusal to examine 
claims of state procedural errors not cognizable for habeas review); Holiday v. Wyrick, 663 F.2d 
789 (8th Cir. 1981) (ineffective assistance of appellate counsel not construed to be included); 
Morrow v. Wyrick, 646 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1981) (failure to raise claims before state or district 
court precluded consideration of claims by court of appeals); Lindner v. Wyrick, 644 F.2d 724 
(8th Cir. 1981) (lack of exhaustion of state claims prevented further review); Bradley v. Fairfax, 
634 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1980) (disclosure of grand jury materials to parole commission harmless 
error); Witham v. Mabry, 596 F.2d 293 (8th Cir. 1979) (failure to seek change of venue not 
ineffective assistance of council). 
 142. See also Nichols v. Bowersox, 172 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1999) (one-year grace period 
permitted for filing habeas petition); Buckley v. Rogerson, 133 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 1998) (use of 
segregation and restraints violation of constitutional rights); Martin v. Gerlinski, 133 F.3d 1076 
(8th Cir. 1998) (policy considering sentencing factors contrary to early release statute); Anderson 
v. Hopkins, 113 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 1997) (consideration of invalid aggravating circumstance not 
harmless error); Hochstein v. Hopkins, 113 F.3d 143 (8th Cir. 1997) (failure to show defendant 
would have received death penalty even without consideration of exceptional depravity 
aggravator constitutional violation); Robinson v. Norris, 60 F.3d 457 (8th Cir. 1995) (act by trial 
court informing defendant of right to file appeal denied defendant right to counsel); Chambers v. 
Armontrout, 16 F.3d 257 (8th Cir. 1994) (order granting state additional period of time to retry 
defendant appealable); Wealot v. Armontrout, 948 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1991) (defendant’s 
Confrontation Clause rights violated when not permitted to cross-examine complainant); Dickens 
v. Armontrout, 944 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1991) (waiver of exhaustion defense offered by state 
should have been accepted); Gilbert v. Lockhart, 930 F.2d 1356 (8th Cir. 1991) (right to counsel 
violated); Travis v. Lockhart, 925 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir. 1991) (interpretation of state crediting 
statute in violation of constitutional protection); Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(equal protection claim fairly presented to state court); Brewer v. Swinson, 837 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 
1988) (concomitant issue permitted habeas review); DeVine v. Solem, 815 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 
1987) (admissions by defendant required remand for determination of harmless error); Anderson 
v. Frey, 715 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1983) (sheriff’s involvement in jury selection violation of due 
process); Tinlin v. Parratt, 680 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1982) (ineffective assistance of counsel at 
previous hearings permitted reversal); Cox v. Hutto, 619 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1980) (stipulation to 
sentence by defense counsel without consent of defendant violated due process rights). 
 143. Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1367. 
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exercise of their peremptory challenges, they are no longer entitled to a 
presumption that they exercised their peremptory challenges in lawful 
manner.147  Judge McMillian further held that the district court properly 
decided the defendant’s equal protection claim without holding an evidentiary 
hearing, and the record supported the court’s finding that the prosecutor’s use 
of peremptory challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause.148 
In Thomas v. Gunter, a Native American inmate brought a 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 civil rights suit alleging that his constitutional rights to free exercise of 
religion and to equal protection were violated because he was denied daily 
access to a prison sweat lodge for prayer.149  The district court entered 
summary judgment in favor of the prison officials holding that the denial of 
extended daily access to a sweat house was rationally related to legitimate 
penological interests.150  The inmate appealed.151  In affirming the district 
court, Judge McMillian held that the denial of the inmate’s request for daily 
and extended access to the sweat lodge, which was located near a truck 
delivery entrance during hours in which the entrance was in use, was 
rational.152 
SOCIAL SECURITY 
In his early years on the court, Judge McMillian wrote many opinions 
dealing with Social Security disability claims.153  Many lawyers and judges 
 
 147. Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 148. 916 F.2d at 1362. 
 149. Thomas v. Gunter, 103 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. For cases in which benefits were granted, see Geigle v. Sullivan, 961 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 
1992) (submission of new evidence permitted reconsideration); Ross v. Social Sec. Admin., 949 
F.2d 1021 (8th Cir. 1991) (claim of improper payment of benefits not frivolous); Jeffcoat v. 
Bowen, 840 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1988) (uncontradicted expert testimony demonstrated disability); 
Highfill v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1987) (Secretary not estopped from reconsideration); 
Folks v. Secretary of Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 825 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1987) (ALJ 
failed to acknowledge shift in burden of proof); Anderson v. Heckler, 805 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 
1986) (ALJ’s failure to consider impairments and complaints of pain allowed reversal); Dover v. 
Bowen, 784 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1986) (burden of proof not met by Secretary); Benson v. Heckler, 
780 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1985) (record not fully developed and required remand); Sharrah v. 
Secretary of Health & Human Services,( 747 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1984) (claimant determined to be 
disabled); Jolly v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1984) (substantial evidence supported 
determination of disability after specific date); Tome v. Schweiker, 724 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(claimant’s disability within meaning of Social Security Act); Brenner v. Schweiker, 711 F.2d 96 
(8th Cir. 1983) (evidence overwhelmingly supported determination of disability); McDonald v. 
Schweiker, 698 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1983) (error in application of grid for disability and full 
consideration of claims of pain required reversal); Gilliam v. Califano, 620 F.2d 691 (8th Cir. 
1980) (expert testimony deficient to refute claim of disability); Hancock v. Secretary of Dep’t of 
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have argued for a specialized court to hear Social Security cases.  But Judge 
McMillian has always supported the view that Social Security claims are so 
important to the individual that it is far better that these cases be reviewed in a 
generalist court rather than in a specialized court.  His exacting review is best 
illustrated in cases like Rainey v. Department of Health & Human Services.154  
In Rainey, a claimant sought review of the decision of the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services denying his application for disability benefits based on 
his heart condition.155  After the district court affirmed the denial of benefits, 
Judge McMillian reversed and remanded the case, holding that the 
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) was required to give express reasons for 
rejecting the claimant’s subjective complaints of pain.156  The reasons 
previously given by the ALJ did not indicate that the claimant’s participation 
in minor activities was inconsistent with his allegations of disabling pain.157 
RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD 
In Bowman v. Railroad Retirement Board,158 the petitioner filed an 
application for disability annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act.159  The 
Railroad Retirement Board determined that the petitioner was not disabled, and 
the petitioner sought review.160  Upon review by the United States Court of 
Appeals, Judge McMillian affirmed the denial of benefits, holding that a 
hearing officer was justified in discounting the petitioner’s subjective 
complaints of pain and that substantial evidence supported the determination 
that the petitioner retained residual functional capacity to perform sedentary 
work.161  He further found substantial evidence supported the determination 
 
Health, Educ. & Welfare, 603 F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1979) (single report by physician not deemed 
substantial evidence sufficient to uphold denial of benefits). 
For cases in which benefits were denied, see Weber v. Apfel, 164 F.3d 431 (8th Cir. 1999) (ALJ 
warranted in discrediting physician’s opinions); Pertuis v. Apfel, 152 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(administrative record supported determination that no disability existed); Pyland v. Apfel, 149 
F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 1998) (substantial evidence supported determination that no disability existed); 
Rowden v. Warden, 89 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 1996) (failure to exhaust administrative remedies); 
Board of Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 1995) (prohibition of 
redistribution of costs from medical school); Pickner v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(substantial evidence supported denial of benefits); Eldridge v. Sullivan, 980 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 
1992) (failure to establish wage-earner paternity denied benefits); MacDonald v. Bowen, 850 
F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1988) (evidence supported denial of benefits). 
 154. 48 F.3d 292 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 155. Id. at 293. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. 952 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 159. Id. at 208. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 211. 
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that there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the 
petitioner was capable of performing.162 
In Arp v. Railroad Retirement Board,163 a former railroad employee 
appealed from the final decision of the Railroad Retirement Board affirming a 
decision denying the employee’s application for employee disability annuity 
under the Railroad Retirement Act.164  Judge McMillian denied the petition, 
holding that the Railroad Retirement Board’s determination that the former 
employee had residual functional capacity to perform medium work and was 
not entitled to disability annuity, was supported by substantial evidence despite 
the employee’s exposure to toxic chemicals.165  Similarly, in Carmack v. 
Railroad Retirement Board,166 a retired railroad employee petitioned for 
review of an order of the Railroad Retirement Board denying his application 
for disability annuity.167  Judge McMillian affirmed the denial holding that 
substantial evidence supported the Board’s order.168 
BLACK LUNG BENEFITS 
Judge McMillian reviewed many cases where parties claimed a disability 
from black lung disease.  In Yauk v. Department of Labor,169 the widow of a 
coal miner sought black lung survivor’s benefits.170  The Department of Labor 
Benefits Review Board denied the petition, and the widow appealed.171  In 
permitting the benefits, Judge McMillian held that the ALJ improperly 
determined that the miner did not have ten years of mining employment in 
order to qualify for the presumption that the disability was caused by black 
lung disease.172  The ALJ failed to apply the rule under which the miner was 
entitled to one year of credit for every year during which the evidence 
established that he had worked 125 days in mines.173  After applying the 
formula, Judge McMillian found that the miner had the necessary ten years of 
employment.174  Furthermore, he concluded that a remand for further 
consideration was not necessary because the claimant had satisfied the only 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. 850 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 164. Id. at 466. 
 165. Id. at 468. 
 166. 928 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 270. 
 169. 912 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 170. Id. at 193. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 196. 
 173. Id. at 195. 
 174. Yauk, 912 F.2d at 195. 
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other additional requirement, that he had sustained lung damage, and the 
government had failed to rebut the presumption of disability.175 
In Hudson v. Department of Labor,176 a claimant petitioned for review of a 
Department of Labor Benefits Review Board order denying his claim for black 
lung benefits.177  Judge McMillian held, in granting the benefits, that the ALJ’s 
finding that the claimant worked no more than seven years in coal mine 
employment and, thus, was not entitled to the statutory presumption was not 
supported by substantial evidence.178  The record established at least ten years 
of coal mine employment and, therefore, supported a finding of total disability 
arising out of coal mine employment.179 
INSURANCE, CONTRACTS 
In Mansker v. TMG Life Insurance Co.,180 the administrator of an insured’s 
estate filed suit against an ERISA group health insurer, alleging that the insurer 
owed benefits for hospital bills relating to a fatal injury sustained by the 
insured employee when a gas stove exploded in his motor home.181  The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insured’s estate 
administrator, and the insurer appealed.182  In affirming the grant of summary 
judgment, Judge McMillian held that the insured’s injuries were covered and 
did not fall within the exclusion for injuries “arising from employment.”183  He 
found that the district court had the authority to determine benefits even though 
an insurer had not made a determination as to reasonableness or necessity of 
expenses.184  He also found that the award of attorney fees at $200 per hour 
was not excessive.185 
Additionally, in Continental Insurance Companies v. Northeastern 
Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc.,186 an insurer brought suit against a 
chemical producer and its former officers and directors seeking declaration that 
the insurer was under no duty to defend from or to indemnify the producer for 
liability arising out of environmental suits after the discovery of improper 
disposal of hazardous waste.187  The district court granted summary judgment 
 
 175. Id. at 196. 
 176. 851 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 217. 
 179. Id. at 218. 
 180. 54 F.3d 1322 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 181. Id. at 1325. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 1327. 
 184. Id. at 1329. 
 185. Mansker, 54 F.3d at 1330. 
 186. 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 187. Id. at 981. 
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in favor of the insurer on one count and dismissed another count with 
prejudice.188  On rehearing en banc, Judge McMillian held that the 
environmental contamination was “property damage” and the exposure theory 
of coverage would provide for the insurer’s liability for damages caused by the 
insured.189  He found the term “damages,” as used in the standard general 
liability insurance policy form, did not include cleanup costs under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act 
(“CERCLA”) or the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”).190 
In LaSociete Generale Immobiliere v. Minneapolis Community 
Development Agency,191 a real estate developer brought an action against a city 
and the city’s community development authority asserting breach of contract 
and due process claims arising from the city’s last-minute rejection of the 
design for a proposed shopping area.192  The district court entered judgment on 
the jury verdict for the corporation but reduced the jury award.193  On appeal, 
Judge McMillian reversed the district court’s decision.194  He wrote that, as a 
matter of law, the contract unambiguously gave the city the right to approve 
the development’s design and the trial court should not have sent to the jury 
the question of whether the city breached the contract by rejecting the 
design.195  Judge McMillian also found that the developer was not hindered in 
his efforts to obtain a second anchor tenant for the development so as to excuse 
the developer’s nonperformance of contract.196  Finally, he found that the 
developer had not made a timely claim of delay by a lawsuit brought by 
owners of the property in the area in question.197 
NATIVE AMERICANS 
In Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota,198 an American Indian 
Tribe, which sought tribal-state compact under the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act (“Act”), brought an action against the state and state officials alleging 
violation of the Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.199  The district court denied the 
Tribe’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and both parties filed motions for 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 983-84. 
 190. Id. at 987. 
 191. 44 F.3d 629 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 635. 
 194. Id. at 641. 
 195. Id. at 637. 
 196. LaSociete Generale Immobiliere, 44 F.3d at 638. 
 197. Id. 
 198. 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 199. Id. 
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summary judgment.200  The district court denied the motions, and the parties 
appealed.201  Judge McMillian affirmed the district court’s denials and held 
that the state could, in good faith, refuse to negotiate with the Tribe.202  He 
found that genuine issues of material fact existed to preclude summary 
judgment about whether the state’s refusal to negotiate certain locations for 
gaming facilities was a failure to negotiate in good faith under the Act, and the 
action was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.203 
OTHER SIGNIFICANT CASES 
In the case of Starr v. Mandanici,204 an ethics grievance was filed against 
the Independent Counsel, Kenneth Starr, alleging various violations.205  The 
complainant sought referral of the grievance for investigation and formal 
disciplinary proceeding.206  The district court denied the motion for recusal and 
dismissed the complaints.207  On appeal, Judge McMillian dismissed the 
complaint for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the complainant lacked standing 
to commence formal action on the grievance and, thus, lacked standing to 
appeal the grievance’s dismissal.208  In so holding, he rejected the 
complainant’s argument that standing existed because the vital interest derived 
 
 200. Id. at 275. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 281. 
 203. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 3 F.3d at 281. In addition, see United States v. Yankton, 
168 F.3d 1096 (8th Cir. 1999) (offense of being an accessory after the fact to larceny not subject 
to Indian Country Crimes Act’s exception to federal jurisdiction for Indian-on-Indian crimes); 
Thomas v. Gunter, 103 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 1997) (Native American prison inmate’s equal 
protection rights were not violated by prison officials’ denial of request for extended access to a 
sweat lodge for prayer purposes); Shangreau v. Babbitt, 68 F.3d 208 (8th Cir. 1995) (the White 
Earth Land Settlement Act of 1985, which barred child from inheriting compensation for illegally 
taken allotment by right of representation through father, did not violate equal protection rights); 
United States v. Lester, 992 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1993) (Justice Department’s internal policy, which 
would preclude federal prosecution of any person previously prosecuted by another sovereign for 
the same conduct, did not confer any substantive rights and, thus, did not preclude federal 
prosecution even though the defendant had already been convicted in tribal court); United States 
v. Norquay, 905 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1990) (sentence imposed under Indian Major Crimes Act 
only had to fall within range established by state law, but within that range, federal sentencing 
guidelines are used); United States v. Blue, 722 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1983) (statute denying 
exclusive United States jurisdiction over punishment of offenses committed by one Indian against 
the person or property of another Indian, did not place exclusive jurisdiction in tribal courts, even 
though offenses were not among the specified major crimes over which federal courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction). 
 204. 152 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 205. Id. at 742-43. 
 206. Id. at 743. 
 207. Id. at 742. 
 208. Id. at 751. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1294 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:1269 
from the uniqueness of the case and the proceedings forming its backdrop 
conferred standing on all citizens.209 
In United States v. McDougal,210 the President of the United States filed a 
motion for a protective order to prevent the distribution of his videotaped 
deposition testimony used at trial in the underlying criminal case.211  The 
district court denied physical access to the videotape and several media 
organizations appealed.212  Judge McMillian affirmed the district court’s 
decision to deny access, holding that the videotape was not a judicial record for 
purposes of the common law right of public access to judicial records.213  He 
concluded that even if the videotape was a judicial record, it was neither an 
abuse of discretion nor a violation of the First Amendment to deny access 
where the public and the press were given access to the information contained 
in the videotape.214 
Finally, in Little Rock Family Planning Services v. Dalton,215 Medicaid 
providers and recipients challenged an amendment to the Arkansas 
Constitution which prohibited the use of public funds for abortions except to 
save the life of the mother.216  The district court enjoined the enforcement of 
the amendment.217  An appeal was taken and consolidated with the decision of 
the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska enjoining 
enforcement of a Nebraska regulation which also prohibited the use of public 
funds for abortions except to save the life of the mother.218  Judge McMillian 
affirmed the district court’s decisions and held that the challenged provisions 
were invalid under the Supremacy Clause.219  The Court of Appeal’s decision 
was later overturned by the United States Supreme Court in Dalton v. Little 
Rock Family Planning Services.220  The Court held that as long as the program 
was entirely state funded, the application of the program’s provisions would 
not conflict with any federal statute, eliminating the bar on the validity of the 
provisions.221 
 
 209. Starr, 152 F.3d at 748. 
 210. 103 F.3d 651 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 652. 
 213. Id. at 656. 
 214. Id. at 658. 
 215. 60 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1995). 
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 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 503. 
 220. 516 U.S. 474 (1996). 
 221. Id. at 476-77. 
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DISSENTS 
Judge McMillian has written some 245 dissents during his tenure on the 
Court of Appeals.  Many of them are significant.  Although space and time 
restrictions do not allow me to go into detail on the many dissents Judge 
McMillian has written, I mention one of the more recent cases in which he 
dissented to a per curiam denial of a certificate of appealability.222  The 
majority of the court denied a certificate to the petitioner, Arnold Hohn, who 
sought a new trial under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the ground that he was convicted 
for an erroneous application of the “use” of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 924 
(c)(2), arguing that it did not conform to the principles outlined in Bailey v. 
United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116S.Ct. 501 (1995).223  The majority held that 
this was not a claim of a constitutional right under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(2).224  
Judge McMillian dissented because he felt the Due Process Clause did not 
permit a federal conviction for conduct that does not violate a federal 
statute.225  In an emotional response, Judge McMillian concluded: 
I conclude that depriving persons of the benefit of the delayed notice that 
conduct is innocent violates Due Process by tolerating convictions for conduct 
that was never criminal.  Under that proposition, a post-Bailey § 2255 motion 
presents a constitutional question as required by amended § 2253 (c)(2).  I also 
conclude Hohn’s case presents a “substantial showing of the denial of a 
constitutional right.”  Accordingly, I would grant a certificate of 
appealability.226 
The United States Supreme Court adopted Judge McMillian’s dissent and 
reversed the case.227 
Dissents serve diverse purposes which are instrumental in defining the law.  
Dissents often serve as a tool to sharpen the majority’s opinion by narrowing it 
or perhaps by bringing about changes in some of the significant aspects of a 
majority opinion.  They are also helpful to the bench and bar by reason of the 
fact that they narrow the issues involved in the case.  Often, the dissent can 
serve as a basis to change the law as future cases are handed down by this 
court and other courts of appeals.  The one outstanding aspect, particularly as 
they pertain to Judge McMillian’s dissents, is that they demonstrate his 
searching analysis of the law and his willingness to speak out where he feels 
the majority is wrong. 
 
 222. Hohn v. United States, 99 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 223. Id. at 892-93. 
 224. Id. at 893. 
 225. Id. at 894. 
 226. Id. at 895. 
 227. See Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998). 
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